Self-Determination in International Mediation: Some Preliminary Reflections by Nolan-Haley, Jacqueline
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2005
Self-Determination in International Mediation:
Some Preliminary Reflections
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley
Fordham University School of Law, jnolanhaley@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Self-Determination in International Mediation: Some Preliminary Reflections , 7 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 277
(2005-2006)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/284
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION: SOME PRELIMINARY
REFLECTIONS
By: Jacqueline Nolan-Haley*
I. INTRODUCTION1
Few concepts have generated as much discussion in the post-
war international legal system as that of "self-determination."
Scholars debate the proper identity of the "selves" endowed with
this right, its boundaries and its normative relevance. When the
focus turns to mediation, the discussion becomes murky because
the concept of self-determination has both procedural and substan-
tive components and is noticeably different in the private and pub-
lic sectors.2
The generic concept of self-determination relates to ideas of
democratic governance and the Enlightenment belief that legiti-
mate government depends upon the consent of the governed. As
adapted to private mediation theory, the right of self-determina-
tion allows parties to participate in decision-making and volunta-
rily determine the outcome of their disputes. This understanding
of self-determination is rooted in the philosophical principle of per-
sonal autonomy and is expressed through the legal doctrine of in-
formed consent. The simple version of the normative story states
that those who are affected by a dispute should voluntarily consent
to the outcome of that dispute. In short, "party" self-determina-
tion in mediation gives ownership of the conflict to the disputants.
The self-determination story becomes more complex under in-
ternational law. In theory, as a substantive legal principle, self-de-
termination is the foundational value of the sovereign state,
broadly understood as a democratic principle that requires the con-
sent of the governed. International law limits the legal privilege of
* Professor of Law, Director ADR and Conflict Resolution Program, Fordham University
School of Law.
I I would like to thank my research assistant, Devin Tuohey, for his valuable assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
2 In this Article, the term "private sector mediation" refers to the mediation of disputes or
conflicts between private parties. The term "public sector mediation" refers to the mediation of
disputes or conflicts between states, ethnic groups and communities.
278 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 7:277
self-determination to nations and peoples, referring to "national"
rather than "party" or "group" self-determination.'
In contrast to its honored status in private mediation, little at-
tention is paid to the procedural aspects of self-determination in
public mediation.4 This Article will focus on how we account for
this missing process value in public mediation discourse, and why
the discourse matters.5
II. SELF-DETERMINATION IN PRIVATE MEDIATION
The principle of self-determination in mediation offers proce-
dural justice protections, providing parties with fairness and dig-
nity.6  The inherent attraction of self-determination is its
connection to self-governance and individual autonomy. In U.S.
domestic practice, self-determination is widely accepted as the in-
trinsic value of mediation.7 The legal principle of informed consent
provides the structure through which this value is measured.8 In-
formed consent promotes respect for human dignity through its
emphasis on participatory, knowledgeable and consensual deci-
sion-making. Parties' perceptions of procedural justice are en-
hanced when they actively participate in the mediation process and
3 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (2001) [hereinafter CASSESE]; HILARY
CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMI-
NIST ANALYSIS 151 (2000) [hereinafter CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN]; Gregory H. Fox, Book
Review, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus? 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 733 (1995) ("The self endowed with the right to determine its future must coincide with the
territorial state.").
4 A recent notable exception is Eileen Babbitt, Self-Determination as a Component of Con-
flict Intractability: Implications for Negotiation, in NEGOTIATING SELF-DETERMINATION 115
(Hurst Hannum & Eileen F. Babbitt eds., 2006).
5 This is part of a larger project on the forms and limits of self-determination in mediation.
6 A rich literature on procedural justice suggests that parties are more likely to believe that
they have received distributive justice if they feel that they have been treated fairly. See, e.g.,
Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal
Authorities, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 983 (2000); Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of
Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49
(2004) (discussing benefits of procedural justice in conflict resolution processes).
7 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005) Standard I (stating that a
mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination); MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II (noting that the impartiality of a media-
tor reinforces self-determination); MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard
VI (explaining that the quality of the process directs the mediator to conduct the process in a
manner that promotes party participation and self-determination).
8 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999).
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voluntarily consent to an outcome that is free of any coercive influ-
ences. European mediation practice is similar in this regard. The
proposed European Code of Conduct for Mediators advises
mediators to give all parties adequate opportunity to be involved in
the mediation process and to ensure that all agreements are
reached through informed consent.9
Notwithstanding the strong emphasis on self-determination in
private mediation, scholars have observed a disconnect between its
theory and practice.'" While self-determination appears to be an
explicit value in private mediation, in fact, much depends upon the
"frame" in which mediation is conducted and the place and the
culture in which mediation takes place. Expressions of self-deter-
mination may look very different depending upon whether media-
tion is labeled facilitative or evaluative," transformative 12 or
narrative,13 and whether it occurs in a court-based facility 4 or with
private providers.' 5 More importantly, the lens of culture is a criti-
9 See EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Section 3.3, available at http://
www.adrgroup.co.uk ("The mediator shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that any un-
derstanding is reached by all parties through knowing and informed consent, and that all parties
understand the terms of the agreement.") (last visited April 3, 2005).
1o Empirical studies of civil court mediation in the U.S. suggest that practice does not follow
theory and that party self-determination is of secondary importance to judges, lawyers and par-
ties. Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons
from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399 (2004/2005) (finding
that procedural justice goals are discounted in court mediation) [hereinafter McAdoo & Welsh].
11 Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES
TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 111-114 (1994).
12 Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, Transformative Mediation: Principles and
Practice, in DIVORCE MEDIATION IN DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 53-71 (J. Folberg et al.
eds., 2004).
13 JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
14 Critical commentary and the limited empirical studies that we have suggest that in court
mediation, for example, pro se parties may experience diminished forms of self-determination,
and that for judges, lawyers, and some litigants, self-determination is less important than other
values. McAdoo & Welch, supra note 10 at 415-20; see also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Court Me-
diation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 27 (1996) (describing in-
formed consent risks for pro se parties in court mediation programs); Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001) (describing practices of some court
mediators who engage in aggressive evaluations of parties' cases and settlement options with the
goal of winning a settlement, rather than supporting parties in the exercise of self-
determination).
15 For example, mediators have the power to make recommendations in the AAA Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution Procedures (2003), the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act of
1996 and the New Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. See JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, HAROLD ABRAM-
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cal component in shaping and understanding party self-determina-
tion. Western, individualist cultures typically honor a form of self-
determination that gives the disputing parties significant control
over deciding the outcome. In contrast, more traditional, collectiv-
ist cultures value the interests of the community over those of the
individual in deciding outcomes. Cultural considerations also influ-
ence mediator behavior. In Continental Europe, mediators' civil
law orientation shapes their behaviors in influencing party deci-
sion-making. 16 Likewise, in Islamic and some Arab cultures, the
"wisely directive" mediator is expected to put pressure on the par-
ties to reach an agreement. 17 Thus, depending upon cultural con-
texts, moral persuasion and coercion can be justifiable practices in
mediation. 1
Despite the various and sometimes conflicting modes of ex-
pressing self-determination in private mediation practice, there is a
significant public discourse and a recognition of it as an explicit
process value. The following sections will illustrate how this dis-
course is notably absent in public sector mediation practice.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION IN PUBLIC MEDIATION
The concept of self-determination in public international me-
diation must be understood in relationship to both international
law and dispute resolution principles. As a substantive principle of
international law, the historical roots of self-determination in the
West have been traced to the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt,19
while its modern engagement began at the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence. President Woodrow Wilson championed the ideal of self-de-
termination and introduced it to the League of Nations in 1919 as
"the right of every people to choose the sovereign under which
they live, to be free of alien masters, and not be handed about from
SON & PAT K.CHEW, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESSES
129 (2005) [hereinafter NOLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON & CHEW].
16 NOLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON & CHEW, supra note 15, at 130-31 (discussing how in Ger-
many and Italy mediators tend to be evaluative and directive, thus diminishing self-
determination).
17 I credit Professor Harold Abramson for developing the notion of the "wisely directive"
mediator.
18 NOLAN-HALEY, ABRAMSON & CHEW, supra note 15, at 133.
19 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 92 (1995).
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sovereign to sovereign as if they were property."2 Article I of the
United Nations Charter continued the self-determination theme by
describing the development of ". . .friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of peoples ... " as one of the purposes of the United Na-
tions.21 Over the twenty years following adoption of the Charter,
understandings of the substantive legal principle of self-determina-
tion evolved into recognition of it as a fundamental right. In 1966,
two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights included ac-
knowledgment of the right of self-determination for the con-
tracting parties by connecting it to political, civil, economic, social
and cultural rights. Article I of both Covenants on Human Rights
states:
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 22
The legal right to self-determination that allows people or groups
to choose their own forms of political government is a well-estab-
lished part of international law in the anti-colonialist context.23 It
also prohibits foreign military occupation and requires access to
government for all racial groups. 24  Beyond these three areas, the
boundaries of the right of self-determination as a substantive inter-
national legal principle are unclear. 25 Should it be limited to situa-
tions of colonial rule? To the claims of indigenous peoples? Who
20 Eric M. Amberg, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine,
22 SAN DIEOO L. REV. 839, 842 (1985) (quoting President Woodrow Wilson).
21 U.N. Charter art. 1, paragraph 2.
22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
23 See Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current In-
ternational Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21 (1992).
24 Scholars distinguish between the concept of internal and external self-determination:
Peoples under colonial domination have the right to external self-determination, that
is, to opt for the establishment of a sovereign State. The same right accrues to peo-
ples subjected to foreign military occupation after their obtaining or recovering inde-
pendence. Any racial group denied full access to government in a sovereign State is
entitled to either external self-determination (independence, integration into an ex-
isting State, etc.) or even internal self-determination (the pursuit of its political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing State).
CASSESE, supra note 3 at 106.
25 See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism and the Paradox of Self-
Determination, University of Toronto Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-03, April 2005, avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=702465 (last visited April 25, 2005).
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are the "people" for whom the right attaches? Who belongs to the
group and who decides?26
IV. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
Customary international law and the United Nations Charter
require states to seek peaceful resolution of their disputes. Article
33 of the UN Charter specifically recognizes mediation as one of
the dispute resolution processes to be used when international
peace and security is threatened.27 In international law, very little
attention is paid to how mediation should be conducted, and how
parties should be treated in the process. This gap is a serious omis-
sion. Considering the prominence of mediation as an international
dispute resolution process, greater attention must be paid to how
the demands of self-determination and procedural justice can be
satisfied so that parties experience fairness in the mediation pro-
cess. In this regard, Professor Thomas Franck's argument that the
fairness of international law should be judged by the participant's
expectations of procedural, as well as substantive or distributive
justice, is equally true of international mediation.28 When states,
ethnic groups and communities participate in mediation, their ex-
periences of procedural justice affect their assessments of process
fairness. Participation also affects the extent to which they commit
to honor the outcome of mediation, as compliance typically follows
consent; however, consent must be freely offered. Where
mediators with significant resources pressure parties into conces-
sions,2 9 the result may be diminished forms of self-determination
and non-sustainable agreements. On the other hand, parties who
are informed about the mediation process, who are treated with
dignity and actively participate in decision-making, and who reach
non-coerced agreements, are more likely to honor the agreements
that they reach.
Despite the importance of self-determination and informed
consent in mediation, there exists little guidance on how these as-
26 Some feminist scholars argue that in many cases the achievement of national self-determi-
nation has led to a regression in the position of women. "Apparently successful claims of self-
determination fail to deliver the same level of personal freedom and autonomy for women as for
men." CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 2, at 154-55, n.184.
27 U.N. Charter art. 33.
28 FRANCK, supra note 19, at 4-9.
29 See Marieke Kleiboer, Great Power Mediation: Using Leverage to Make Peace?, in STUD-
IES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002).
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pects of procedural justice should be satisfied in public interna-
tional mediation.3" Unlike private mediation practice, there are no
Model Standards of Conduct to guide mediators on the meaning of
self-determination. Instead of a general discourse about the mean-
ing of self-determination in the public mediation sphere, the litera-
ture on international mediation theory focuses largely on the role
and functions of mediators and their use of power.3' Within the
current theoretical framework, understandings of procedural jus-
tice and self-determination differ depending upon the type of inter-
vention strategies employed by mediators, the formal or informal
nature of mediation and conceptions of mediator power and
leverage.32
The absence of discourse, however, does not mean that self-
determination is an unrecognizable concept in public mediation
practice. In recent years, there have been several attempts to incor-
porate the procedural aspects of self-determination and informed
consent practices into mediation. But, as illustrated in the follow-
ing cases, these practices have been, at best, imperfect.
A. Self-Determination - Incomplete
The principle of self-determination, as expressed through in-
formed consent procedures, is inclusive and requires that all stake-
holders be identified and represented in mediated negotiations.33
30 The literature tends to focus on the mediator's behavior, not the mediation process. See
generally STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 127 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) (describing
theories and practices of international mediators in varied contexts); RESOLVING INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996)
(describing a range of mediator behaviors that impact on bias, neutrality, power, and culture).
31 See, e.g., Peter J. Carnevale, Mediating from Strength, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ME-
DIATION 25 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) (describing multiple sources of mediator power); Dean
G. Pruittt, Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation, in, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIA-
TION 41 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) (discussing disputant behavior during conflict resolution,
mediator behavior, and the conditions that foster acceptance of and success in mediation).
32 Jacob Bercovitch, Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context, in STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL MEDIATION 15 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002).
33 In his recent book, The Moral Imagination, John Paul Lederach emphasizes the impor-
tance of having all stakeholders involved in negotiations:
Tajikistan, as journalist Ahmed Rashid convincingly argues, is the only country in the
region or the world for that matter to have ended a brutal civil war with the "creation
of a coalition government that included Islamicists, neo-communists, and clan
leaders.
He goes on to note: "Islamicists lost elections, but they were represented in the elections, and
they accepted their loss." JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND
SOUL OF BUILDING PEACE 17 (2005).
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Examples of self-determination procedural mishaps can be found
in the growing body of literature about the tensions between indig-
enous communities and national governments over ownership of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge.34 A case in point is a
U.S. sponsored, bioprospecting35 project in Chiapas, Mexico that
failed to include all relevant stakeholders in the informed consent
process.36 The project was designed to produce drugs from plants
and microfungi used by the Mayan community in Mexico. Mexican
law required the "informed consent" of the owner or legal posses-
sor of the land where the biotechnological material was located.37
The communities whose consent was required included about eight
thousand villages and about nine hundred thousand Mayan-speak-
ing people. As part of its informed consent efforts, the research
team conducted an extensive information campaign in Mayan com-
munities. Despite the consent of the majority of communities to
participate in the project, there was strong opposition from local
NGOs who claimed that their voices had not been heard. As a
result of their opposition, the project was doomed.38
B. Self-Determination - Ignored
Voluntary consent, a necessary part of self-determination, is
critical to the long-term sustainability of mediation agreements.39
The ongoing conflict between China and Tibet over Chinese occu-
pation of Tibet exemplifies the vulnerability of agreements where
34 See, e.g., Sara A. Laird & Flavia Noejovich, Building Equitable Research Relationships
with Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities: Prior Informed Consent and Research Agree-
ments, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS IN PRAC-
TICE 187-88 (Sara A. Laird ed., 2002) (discussing informed consent protocols with indigenous
peoples); Laurel A. Firestone, You Say Yes, I Say No; Defining Community Prior Informed Con-
sent Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 171 (2003)
(discussing informed consent as a mechanism to insure community involvement, participation,
decision-making and self-determination).
35 The term "bioprospecting" refers to the collection of biological samples (plants, animals
and micro-organisms) and indigenous knowledge to help in discovering genetic resources. The
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) requires that parties engaged in bioprospecting must
obtain the informed consent of the source country. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Bioprospecting (last visited April 6, 2006).
36 Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The International
Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life. 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 641. 655-57 (2004).
37 Id. at 656.
38 Id. at 656.
39 In the domestic context, when a court finds that valid consent is suspect or missing from a
negotiated agreement, its life span is short-lived. Nolan-Haley, supra note 8. at 806-10.
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true consent is missing. Despite an agreement negotiated between
the Chinese government and Tibetan representatives in 1951,
under which China asserted a claim to rule Tibet, conflict over self-
determination of the Tibetan people still persists because a sub-
stantial segment of the Tibetan population believes that their rep-
resentatives signed the agreement under coercion. a
A second example of a failed self-determination process in-
volves the long-standing conflict between Cyprus and Greece.
Scholars have argued that the 1960 constitutional settlement in Cy-
prus was considered to have been imposed on the Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriot communities by the British and other outsiders. 41 The
political process involved a series of agreements to create a consti-
tutional system that would establish a balance of power between
the two communities on Cyprus. Cypriot representatives did not
participate in drafting the agreement 42 and when invited to London
to sign the final agreement, the Greek Cypriot leader signed under
force and without authority.43 The parties' lack of consent and the
corresponding element of coerciveness contributed to the failure of
the agreement during the implementation phase.44
C. Self-Determination - Misused
If exported without regard to context, Western-style mediation
with its "pure" form of party self-determination can result in disas-
ter. As Melanie Greenberg has observed in the case of Rwanda
and Bosnia, "[p]rocedural justice does not always lead to norma-
tive justice ...-4 Greenberg powerfully describes the tragedy that
resulted when American/Western-style mediation was exported to
areas of violent and intractable conflict. In Rwanda and Bosnia,
40 See MICHAEL C. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, THE STATUS OF TIBET: HISTORY. RIGHTS, AND
PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1987): Regina M. Clark, China's Unlawful Control
Over Tibet: The Tibetan People's Entitlement To Self-Determination, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 293 (2002).
41 See, e.g., Fen Osler Hampson, Why Orphaned Peace Settlements Are More Prone to Fail-
ure, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CON-
FLICT, 533, 538 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Fen Osler Hampson].
42 David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 141,
145 (1996).
43 Id.
44 Fen Osler Hampson, supra note 41 at 538.
45 Melanie Greenberg, Mediating Massacres: When "Neutral, Low-Power" Models of Media-
tion Cannot and Should not Work, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 185 (2003).
2006] 285
286 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 7:277
Western mediators practiced what she describes as a "neutral low-
power" [NLP] mediation model where the mediator is expected to
be neutral with no power beyond moral persuasion to coerce par-
ties into action. Pure party self-determination in the NLP model,
as noted by Greenberg, is not effective with spoilers46 and its re-
sults in Rwanda and Bosnia were the massacres for which the inter-
national community still feels shame.47
V. THE DILEMMA OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
As a matter of general principle, international law does not
recognize a legal right of self-determination for ethnic groups
whose claims have generated much of the conflict that calls for in-
ternational mediation efforts today.48 Many of the current contexts
in which mediation occurs involve ethnic groups where the heart of
the conflict concerns the fundamental right of self-determination.49
Public discourse on ethnic conflict focuses primarily on competing
ideologies about the boundaries of the substantive right of self-de-
termination and group autonomy.50 Little attention is paid to the
procedural aspects of self-determination in mediation - concepts
such as fairness, participatory decision-making and voluntary con-
sent to the outcome. To the extent that the ethno-nationalist con-
cern with self-determination as a substantive, fundamental right in
international law has dulled interest in thinking about self-determi-
nation as a process value in mediation, the mediation of ethnic con-
flicts is likely to be flawed. Neither the substantive nor the
procedural values of self-determination in international law are
valuable as stand-alone concepts. Rather, they must be viewed as
complementary. How viable is a right of national self-determina-
tion to a given ethnic group if it is denied the right to participate
fully in mediation and decide the outcome of its conflict?
46 Greenberg, supra note 45, at 188, 204.
47 Id. at 194.
48 CASSESE, supra note 3, at 108.
49 See, e.g., Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination, 11 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 433 (1996) (describing growth of Zulu ethnic identity and its relationsip to the breakup
of the apartheid state): Timothy William Waters, Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives
in the Balkans: Bosnia's Peoples, Democracy, and the Shape of Self-Determination, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 423 (2004) (discussing how Bosnia's constituent nations had few grounds for a conven-
tional self-determination claim).
50 See, e.g., RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS
(1997) (describing factors that contribute to successful autonomy regimes).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current, haphazard understanding of the procedural as-
pects of self-determination in international mediation has netted
mixed results. While in some cases, lip service is paid to informed
consent procedures, overall lack of regard for procedural self-de-
termination threatens the long-term durability of mediated agree-
ments. If, as Professor Thomas Franck has suggested, we are
witnessing the transformation of the substantive right of self-deter-
mination into a commitment to democratic government,5' then we
need to develop a complementary account that advances the prin-
ciples of procedural self-determination in the same direction.
On a hopeful note, recent scholarship on the democratic char-
acter of dispute resolution processes suggests that values such as
party participation, accountability and transparency have powerful
potential to enhance understanding of self-determination in media-
tion.52  Party participation in democratic processes, such as the
public peace process, offers one way of thinking about how to inte-
grate the procedural aspects of self-determination into the media-
tion process. The public peace process engages citizens from
conflicting groups in systematic dialogue in an effort to change the
fundamental relationships between them.53 To the extent that the
public peace process allows citizens to become involved with their
representatives in public discourse and to deliberate with them to
reach reasoned judgments about the issues affecting their lives, the
process can be considered a form of deliberative democracy 54 that
bolsters both the substantive and procedural aspects of self-deter-
51 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992).
52 See, e.g., Symposium, Raising the Bar What Deliberative Democracy Means for Dispute
Resolution, Disp. RESOL. MAO., 5-27 (Winter 2006);Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11 (2005) (dis-
cussing how principles of democracy may be applied in the non-union corporate dispute resolu-
tion context); Richard Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (Winter/Spring 2004) (exploring the relationship between de-
mocracy and arbitration in the context of mandatory arbitration programs); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Lawyers's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2004-05) (exploring
the idea of a "neutral" lawyer without conventional clients or advocacy responsibilities who still
functions as a lawyer by facilitating resolution of disputes).
53 See Gennady I. Chufrin & Harold M. Saunders, A Public Peace Process, 9 NEGOTIATION
J. 155-56 (April 1993).
54 There is extensive literature on deliberative democracy. See, e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIB-
ERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (2000) (exploring
tensions between social choice theory and deliberative democracy and arguing that social choice
theory suggests that democracy must have a deliberative aspect); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
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mination. Tajikistan's example of a successful public peace process
and the resulting mediated peace agreement suggests that citizen
participation in conflict resolution efforts can produce positive and
sustainable outcomes - whether it appears under the label of delib-
erative democracy or procedural self-determination."
Given the realities of international and inter-ethnic conflict
and the potential for disastrous, global, spillover effects, the need
to focus on self-determination in international mediation is more
acute than ever. Mediation efforts will not succeed in the long run
without a level of procedural justice that supports authentic self-
determination and true consent, whether the parties are ethnic
groups, communities, or states.
(Jon Elster ed.. 1998) (discussing conceptual background of deliberative democracy and compar-
ing deliberative democracy with other modes of collective decision making).
55 See Harold H. Saunders, Sustained Dialogue in Managing Intractable Conflict, 19 NEGOTI-
ATION J. 85-91 (Jan. 2003). A peace agreement was negotiated in 1997 under the guidance of a
U.N. mediator. HAROLD H.SAUNDERS, A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO
TRANSFORM RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 152 (1999).
